Young Vermont Men Turn Against Sports Betting — Good for Them, Bad for State Revenue

The rapid rise in negative sentiment among young men—a group historically open to risk and digital gaming—suggests an experiential problem rather than a moral one.

The legalization of sports betting in the United States, sparked by the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision to overturn the federal ban, was originally pitched as a win for personal freedom and a modern way to enjoy sports. For a few years, it seemed to work as advertised. However, as the market matures, public opinion is shifting dramatically—not toward acceptance, but toward skepticism.

According to a 2025 Pew Research Center study, 47% of men under the age of 30 now view legal sports betting as a “bad thing for society.” This figure has more than doubled from just 22% in 2022. This shift is particularly striking because it is occurring within the very demographic the industry targets most aggressively.

This report explores the drivers behind this sentiment, examining the structural mechanics of the modern sportsbook and specific implications for Vermont’s regulated market under Act 63.

The Great Reversal: Understanding the “Churn”

The rapid rise in negative sentiment among young men—a group historically open to risk and digital gaming—suggests an experiential problem rather than a moral one. These users are not judging the industry from the outside; they are reacting to their experiences inside the ecosystem.

The industry operates on a high-velocity acquisition model designed to bring customers in quickly via advertising and sign-up bonuses. However, once users move past the initial “honeymoon phase” of risk-free offers, they encounter the reality of the business model. This cycle is known as “churn.” Users are acquired, engaged through mobile apps, and eventually “consumed”—either by losing their funds or by realizing the structural barriers to winning.

When nearly half of young men label the industry bad for society, they are often citing specific negative externalities:

• Financial Distress: With over half of bettors admitting to chasing losses, the social costs are becoming visible within peer groups.

• Ad Fatigue: The relentless integration of betting odds into sports broadcasts has led to a sense of infiltration, alienating fans who feel the game itself is secondary to the wager.

• The “Rigged” Perception: Users increasingly report that the system feels designed to penalize success, creating a sense that the game is a scam.

The Economics of the “Soft Book”

To understand why users feel the system is rigged against them, it is necessary to look at how modern U.S. sportsbooks operate. The dominant operators in Vermont (DraftKings, FanDuel, and Fanatics) function as Soft Books.

In a traditional “sharp” betting market, operators welcome winning bettors because their wagers help price the market accurately. Soft books operate differently. They do not rely on high volume to balance the books; they rely on a high “hold” (the percentage of money kept).

For these public companies, a consistently winning bettor is viewed not as a customer, but as a liability or a toxic asset. The business model creates a “Ban or Bankrupt” dynamic:

• If you lose: You are retained and offered bonuses to keep playing.

• If you win: You are effectively ejected from the ecosystem through limits or bans.

The Mechanics of Limiting

Modern sportsbooks utilize sophisticated data tracking to identify and restrict skilled players. When users sign up, they consent to tracking that monitors device fingerprints and behavioral patterns.

The primary trigger for limiting a player is often “Closing Line Value” (CLV). If a bettor consistently places wagers at better odds than the final line at game time, the sportsbook’s algorithms flag them as “sharp.” This can happen even if the bettor is currently losing money, as the math suggests they will eventually win.

Once flagged, users experience targeted friction:

• The Collar: A user attempts to bet $100 but receives a notification that their max wager is limited to a negligible amount, such as $5.43.

• The Spin: Accounts may be placed under manual review, resulting in delays that prevent users from betting on time-sensitive odds.

• Prop Bans: Users are frequently banned from specific markets, such as player props, which are easier to beat than the final score spread.

Simultaneously, apps aggressively market Same Game Parlays (SGPs). These bets have a significantly higher house edge than straight bets, funneling users toward products where the math is heavily stacked against them.

The Vermont Context: A Captive Market

Vermont’s entry into sports betting via Act 63 has created a specific environment where these national issues are amplified.

1. The Online-Only Structure

Unlike neighboring states with physical casinos, Vermont utilizes a 100% digital model. Every wager is tracked, meaning there is no anonymity and no retail counter where a skilled bettor can play without algorithmic oversight.

2. The Triopoly

The Department of Liquor and Lottery selected only three operators: DraftKings, FanDuel, and Fanatics. These three are the primary architects of the Soft Book model. By restricting the market to these specific companies, Vermont effectively denies residents access to alternative business models that might tolerate winning players.

3. Regulatory Gaps

While Vermont’s regulations focus heavily on problem gambling and addiction, there is little protection for consumer fairness regarding the “right to win.” Operator House Rules explicitly reserve the right to limit wagers at their sole discretion. For a resident who gets limited by one operator, the options are scarce. Being limited by the three state-sanctioned apps effectively results in a ban from the entire legal market in Vermont.

The Revenue Reality Check

The volatility of this model is already impacting Vermont’s bottom line. While initial projections were optimistic, fiscal realities have forced a downgrade in expectations.

For the 2024 calendar year, Vermont budgeted for approximately $7 million in tax revenue but collected only $6.34 million—a shortfall of roughly 10%. Consequently, the Department of Liquor and Lottery has lowered its forecast for Fiscal Year 2025.

This instability stems from the nature of the revenue stream. Tax revenue relies on the “hold,” which fluctuates based on game outcomes. Furthermore, the “churn” of users—driven by the negative sentiment identified in the Pew study—threatens the long-term sustainability of the tax base. If the primary demographic (young men) stops playing because they feel the system is a scam, the state enters a cycle of diminishing returns.

What Happens Next

The friction between the industry’s profit model and user sentiment is creating a feedback loop. As more players encounter limits after winning, the belief that the system is rigged hardens, validating the “bad for society” heuristic.

For Vermont, the path forward involves navigating these structural inequities:

• Market Saturation: With a small population of roughly 647,000, the “churn” model poses a significant risk. If the majority of eligible young men burn out or opt out within the first few years, revenue stagnation is likely.

• Legislative Potential: Currently, there is no active legislation in Vermont to ban the practice of limiting winners. While states like Massachusetts have held hearings on the matter, Vermont’s regulatory focus remains on revenue and addiction prevention.

• The Stabilization of Sentiment: The industry must decide whether to adjust its model to retain skilled users or continue its aggressive acquisition strategy. Until then, the disconnect between the promise of a fair game and the reality of the “soft book” will likely continue to drive public skepticism.