Same Crime, Wildly Different Punishment: Why Vermont Rarely Locks Up “Death Resulting” Dealers for Long
Victoria Thompson, a defendant facing a "death resulting" charge—a legal classification usually associated with the most severe penalties in the opioid crisis—will avoid any long-term incarceration.
On Wednesday morning in the Windsor Criminal Division, a sentencing hearing concluded that likely left many community members confused. Victoria Thompson, a defendant facing a “death resulting” charge—a legal classification usually associated with the most severe penalties in the opioid crisis—received a sentence that will see her avoid long-term incarceration.
To the casual observer reading a police press release, the outcome may look like a failure of the system or a judicial error. However, a forensic look at Vermont law reveals that this specific outcome is not a loophole, but a feature of the state’s complex drug statutes.
To understand how a potential twenty-year sentence became a release on conditions, one must understand three things: the “safety valve” written into Vermont law, the specific philosophy of the presiding judge, and the difficult reality of proving the cause of death in the age of fentanyl.
The Law: The Sword and the Shield
The case against Thompson was anchored in 18 V.S.A. § 4250, the statute covering “Selling or dispensing a regulated drug with death resulting.”
On paper, this law is designed to be a sword. Subsection (a) mandates that anyone convicted “shall be imprisoned not less than two years nor more than 20 years.” Subsection (c)(1) goes further, stating that this prison time “may not be suspended, deferred, or served as a supervised sentence.” It was written to ensure that those who sell fatal doses of narcotics serve hard time, mirroring the “truth in sentencing” laws of the 1990s.
However, the Vermont Legislature also included a shield. Buried in subsection (c)(2) is a provision that grants judges immense discretion:
“The court may impose a sentence that does not include a term of imprisonment... if the court makes findings on the record that the sentence will serve the interests of justice.”
This “interests of justice” clause is the legal mechanism that defined Wednesday’s hearing. It allows a judge to look beyond the body count and examine the defendant. If the judge determines that the defendant is an addict rather than a predator, or a low-level courier rather than a cartel boss, they have the statutory authority to waive the prison term entirely.
The Judge: A Philosophy of Rehabilitation
The specific sentence handed down cannot be separated from the judge who issued it: Judge Elizabeth Mann.
Judge Mann, a former federal public defender, has established a reputation in the Vermont judiciary for prioritizing rehabilitation over incapacitation. Her approach has frequently drawn sharp contrasts with local law enforcement. As noted in previous reporting by Seven Days, officials like Essex County Sheriff Trevor Colby have criticized her rulings on bail and sentencing, arguing that releasing defendants with active addiction issues often leads to continued community harm.
However, Judge Mann’s supporters, including members of the defense bar, argue that warehousing addicts in prison for “death resulting” charges does not solve the underlying issue. In the Thompson case, Judge Mann likely utilized the “interests of justice” provision to determine that incarceration would disrupt the defendant’s stabilization or treatment. In her view, the “leniency” of the sentence is actually a calculation of proportionality—fitting the punishment to the individual, not just the charge.
The Evidence: The “Iron Pipeline” and Proximate Cause
The final factor in this outcome is the strength of the evidence itself. While press releases often present cases as “open and shut,” the reality of the Thompson case was likely far more complex.
The “Courier” Profile Thompson’s legal troubles began in December 2021 with a traffic stop on I-91 in Greenfield, Massachusetts—the infamous “Iron Pipeline” connecting Holyoke distribution hubs to Vermont. According to local reports from the Greenfield Recorder, Thompson was stopped for speeding through a construction zone with fireworks in the backseat.
These details paint a picture of disorganized, impulsive behavior common among drug users, rather than the calculated operations of a high-level trafficker. Furthermore, she was arrested with a 41-year-old co-defendant, Marshall Gagne. In many such cases, the court views the younger driver as a subordinate to an older passenger, mitigating their culpability.
The Causation Problem Perhaps the biggest hurdle for prosecutors in “death resulting” cases is the issue of “proximate cause.” Under the statute, the state must prove that the specific drug provided by the defendant caused the death.
In the current landscape of the opioid crisis, toxicology reports frequently show “mixed toxicity”—a combination of fentanyl, xylazine, cocaine, and alcohol. If a victim dies with multiple substances in their system, defense attorneys can argue that the state cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s drugs were the sole cause of death. Faced with the risk of losing at trial, prosecutors often agree to a plea deal that secures a conviction record but waives the prison time.
What Happens Next
The sentencing of Victoria Thompson is likely to reignite the debate between Vermont’s judiciary and its law enforcement community regarding how to handle the opioid epidemic.
Currently, the Vermont Sentencing Commission is reviewing proposals to change how these cases are prosecuted. As noted in legislative documents from May 2024, there is a push to create a “permissive inference” that fentanyl is the cause of death in mixed-drug cases. This would lower the burden of proof for prosecutors, making it harder for defendants to avoid prison time based on technical toxicology arguments.
Until the legislature acts to tighten the statute or remove the “interests of justice” safety valve, sentences like the one handed down to Victoria Thompson will remain a distinct possibility in Vermont courts. For now, the system continues to rely on the discretion of judges to navigate the gray area between criminal intent and the tragedy of addiction.